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Abstract—The security of the Internet of Things (IoT) is
receiving considerable interest as the low power constraints and
complexity features of many IoT devices are limiting the use
of conventional cryptographic techniques. This article provides
an overview of recent research efforts on alternative approaches
for securing IoT wireless communications at the physical layer,
specifically the key topics of key generation and physical layer en-
cryption. These schemes can be implemented and are lightweight,
and thus offer practical solutions for providing effective IoT
wireless security. Future research to make IoT-based physical
layer security more robust and pervasive is also covered.
Index Terms—Internet of Things, physical layer security, key
generation, physical layer encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) aims to allow ubiquitous
connections between things with computing, communication,
and sensing ability. IoT applications include smart cities, smart
traffic, healthcare, smart home, industrial monitoring, and en-
vironment monitoring, etc. [1], [2], which have revolutionized
every aspect of our life. On the other hand, many open research
problems still remain to allow this technology to become
widely available as proposed [3]. For example, IoT security
and privacy remains a major concern as indicated by the UK
IoT government report [4] and agreed by many experts [5].
To this end, research into effective IoT security remains a
key objective as indicated by major sponsors such as the US
National Science Foundation [6], the European Horizon 2020
research programs [7], and the UK’s Engineering and Physical
Sciences Research Council [8].
The number of connected devices has already exceeded
the world’s population and is increasing exponentially. It is
predicted by numerous sources that IoT devices will number
10 billion by 2020 [9]. For example, Cisco estimated there
would be 6.58 connected devices per person by 2020, i.e.,
about 50 billion devices in total [10]. With the huge amount of
IoT devices, wireless communication is preferred as it allows
easy installation and provides ubiquitous connection. Wireless
air interfaces involved in the IoT include IEEE 802.15.4
(Zigbee), Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi,
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LoRaWAN, cellular connections, ultrawide band, near field
communication (NFC), radio-frequency identification (RFID),
to name but a few.
While we are enjoying the benefits that wireless connection
has brought, its broadcast nature makes the transmission
vulnerable to passive eavesdropping and active jamming. Thus,
there is a clear need to protect the data on-the-fly in the
IoT as it will generally contain sensitive, private or confi-
dential information. For example, in healthcare applications,
the sensor nodes collect patients’ health information such as
heart rate and blood pressure. This information is private and
highly confidential, and hence a secure transmission channel
is required. However, IoT systems are far from safe and many
vulnerabilities exist [11]. For example, HP reported that 70%
of devices did not encrypt their communications [12].
The security countermeasures are mainly categorized into
computational security and information-theoretic security [13].
The former has been the main approach in protecting the
communication systems where cryptographic algorithms and
protocols are deployed at the upper layers of the protocol
stack [14]. For example, the transport layer security (TLS) is
a well-known protocol to protect the transport link [15] while
Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) is designed to secure the media
access control (MAC) layer1 in the IEEE 802.11 systems [16].
A classical cryptosystem comprises public key cryptography
(PKC) for key distribution2 and symmetric encryption for
data protection, as shown in Figure 1, where Alice and Bob
are the legitimate users wishing to communicate securely.
PKC security relies on exploiting the computational hardness
of mathematical problems, such as discrete logarithm, and
distributes the same session key to Alice and Bob. Symmet-
ric encryption usually occurs in the upper layers, i.e., data
link/MAC layer and above, allowing encryption of plaintext
with the common session key shared between users using
PKC.
Whilst classical cryptosystems have protected conventional
wireless systems, there are challenges in applying these ap-
proaches in IoT. IoT devices range from well-resourced smart-
phones to low cost, low energy and lightweight computing
embedded devices. Many low cost IoT devices cannot afford
the additional silicon area, power consumption, and code
space needed to perform the expensive mathematical calcu-
lations of cryptographic methodologies [17]. In addition, IoT
1IEEE 802 splits the open systems interconnection (OSI) data link layer
into MAC sublayer and logical link control (LLC) sublayer.
2Public key cryptography can also be used for encryption/decryption and
digital signature, which are not discussed in this article.
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Fig. 1. Classic cryptosystem with MAC layer encryption as an example. The gray blocks represent the encrypted data.
applications may work in a device-to-device communication
mode where there is no secured public key infrastructure
(PKI) for the distribution of public keys. Finally, with the
development of quantum computing, the concept of PKC will
be fundamentally challenged [18].
Conventional upper layer-based cryptography also leaves
the transmission vulnerable to many passive and active attacks.
For example, the MAC header is sent in plaintext and attackers
can perform traffic analysis by observing the MAC header. In
addition, the physical packet header is also sent in plaintext
and can reveal side-channel information (SCI) such as data
rate, packet length, mapping schemes, etc. [19]. Eavesdroppers
can perform various attacks based on the observed SCI, such
as analysis of users’ activities and selective jamming.
Therefore, the design of a low cost and robust cryptosystem
for IoT is vital. While the main security streams have focused
on the upper layers, the physical layer can also be leveraged to
enhance security. In fact, reusing the physical layer features
can decrease additional energy cost for security. As shown
in Figure 2, security enhancement at the physical layer can
be twofold. Firstly, information-theoretic security, also known
as physical layer security (PLS), exploits the unpredictable
features of wireless channels, such as fading; therefore, the
system will not be compromised no matter how powerful the
attackers are [20]–[23]. PLS transmission techniques achieve
security through artificial noise [24], jamming [25], or beam-
forming [26], etc. However, many PLS transmission schemes
are not practical yet because they require complex coding
and/or the perfect/imperfect channel state information (CSI)
of the receiver and/or eavesdroppers [13]. On the other hand,
physical layer key generation, an active branch of PLS, is
implementable because the legitimate users are able to agree
on the same key from the noisy channel estimation [27], which
can be used as an alternative to PKC in many circumstances.
Secondly, moving the encryption to the physical layer can
protect the entire physical layer packet and thus the wireless
connection is secured from many passive and active attacks.
Recently, a new hybrid approach considers how we can
deploy cryptosystems directly into the physical layer and
integrates information-theoretical security and computational
security schemes, which are constructed by physical layer
key generation and physical layer encryption (PLE), as shown
in Figure 3. Alice and Bob carry out wireless transmission
over the noisy channel using pilot signals. They are able to
exploit common information of wireless channels and agree
on the same cryptographic key through the key generation
protocol consisted of channel probing, quantization, informa-
tion reconciliation, and privacy amplification. The key is then
fed to the PLE, which performs encryption operations at the
modulation stages of the physical layer, and protects the IoT
wireless transmission. Their integration offers a good example
of how information-theoretic security schemes and compu-
tational security schemes can work together to protect IoT
systems. Security countermeasures from the physical layer are
lightweight and offer protection to the wireless transmission,
and therefore are advantageous over conventional upper layer
encryption-based security primitives.
There have been survey papers on the PLS transmission [28]
and key generation [27], [29] to protect IoT. However, PLS
transmission is limited in practical implementation and a
survey on integration of key generation and encryption has
never been reported. This article aims to provide an overview
on the recent progress of this promising hybrid physical layer
cryptosystem, with a focus on the practical implementation
and algorithm prototyping.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. The wireless
technologies used in IoT are introduced in Section II. We
then describe the physical layer key generation in Section III
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Fig. 3. Key generation and PLE-based cryptosystem. The gray blocks represent the encrypted data.
and PLE in Section IV. Finally, we propose some future
research directions in Section V that make securing IoT from
the physical layer more robust and pervasive. Section VI
concludes the article.
II. WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES FOR IOT AND THEIR
SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES
IoT aims to connect everything together and wireless com-
munication is seen as the best option in order to avoid
installation costs while enabling ubiquitous connection. IoT
devices are normally tiny, embedded, and battery-powered,
and thus communicate with each other through various low-
power wireless communication technologies. This section in-
troduces several popular wireless technologies, including IEEE
802.15.4 (Zigbee), BLE, IEEE 802.11, and LoRaWAN.
IEEE 802.15.4 defines the physical and MAC layer proto-
cols while Zigbee is based on IEEE 802.15.4 and includes
high layer protocols. It runs at an unlicensed industrial,
scientific and medical (ISM) 2.4 GHz frequency and uses
direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) as the physical layer
modulation. IEEE 802.15.4 is energy efficient and supports
a data rate of up to 250 kbps, which is quite suitable for
applications with limited data exchange requirements. It has
been used extensively in wireless sensor networks (WSNs),
especially in industrial applications.
BLE, also known as Bluetooth Smart, was standardized in
2010 as Bluetooth Core Specification Version 4.0. BLE runs
at 2.4 GHz frequency and uses frequency hopping spread
spectrum (FHSS) to combat frequency interference. It supports
short range communications (50 to 100 m) and a data rate of
1 Mbps. In addition, BLE consumes extremely low energy
and can run for months on standard coin-cell batteries. It is
suited for IoT applications such as wearable devices and it
is predicted by the Bluetooth special interest group that more
than 90% smartphones will support BLE by 2018 [30].
IEEE 802.11 families are the most popular wireless local
area network (WLAN) standards working at 2.4/5 GHz. They
include IEEE 802.11a/b/g/n and are supported almost by all
smartphones, laptops, tablets, etc. IEEE 802.11 can be used
in the smart home applications to provide large amounts of
4data transfer and as most houses are already covered by IEEE
802.11, installation costs can be avoided. Whilst legacy IEEE
802.11 standards may not be suitable for many lightweight
IoT applications, IEEE 802.11ah was recently announced by
the Wi-Fi alliance which has been developed explicitly for
IoT. It works at sub 1 GHz bands and can cover large
range communications. In addition, 802.11ah adopts narrower
bandwidth and implements energy efficient protocols to extend
the sensors’ battery life. It is also optimized to support large
groups of stations or sensors that cooperate to share the
signals.
LoRaWAN is an emerging low power wide area network
(WAN) technology with the first specification released in June,
2015 [31]. It also runs at sub 1 GHz and employs chirp spread
spectrum. It supports long range coverage (> 15 km), millions
of users, and low power consumption (up to ten years), and
therefore is extremely suitable for low cost IoT devices.
IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth, and IEEE 802.11 systems usually
handle the security at the data link/MAC layer. For example,
an AES block cipher is used to protect the link layer of IEEE
802.15.4 and Bluetooth systems. In IEEE 802.11 systems, an
MAC layer encryption scheme named WPA has been designed
and implemented using AES. LoRa implements the security
countermeasures by encryption at network and application
layers.
A summary and comparison of the wireless technologies for
the IoT is given in Table I.
III. PHYSICAL LAYER KEY GENERATION
Key generation from the randomness of wireless channels
has been receiving much research interest [27], as it is well-
suited for establishing cryptographic keys as an alternative
to PKC in IoT applications [32]. As shown in Figure 3,
firstly, key generation exploits unpredictable but characteristic
features of the wireless channel, and is thus information-
theoretically secure [33], [34]. Secondly, it can be carried
out between a pair of users with no aid from a third user,
while a secured PKI is always required for PKC. Finally,
key generation is lightweight and uses limited resources as
all of the operations are not complicated and thus meets
the low computation capacity of IoT devices. Zenger et al.
implemented their key generation scheme in a 32-bit ARM
Cortex M3 processor (EFM32GG-STK3700) and an 8-bit Intel
MCS-51 and showed the resource and energy consumption to
be very low [35]. The authors also implemented a lightweight
PKC, elliptic curves Diffie-Hellman key generation (ECDH),
as a comparison. As shown in Table II, taking the implemen-
tation in 32-bit ARM processor as an example, the ECDH
requires 5.73 times more code, 128.26 times more cycles,
and consumes 41.52 times more energy, than that of the key
generation protocol, respectively. Therefore, key generation
from wireless channels is extremely suitable for low cost IoT
devices.
Key generation works well in a dynamic wireless commu-
nication system, and is built on three principles.
• Channel reciprocity means the channel responses of the
forward and backward links are the same, which is the
basis for key generation. When two users measure the
same channel parameters at the same frequency in a time-
division duplex (TDD) mode, the measurements at Alice
and Bob are impacted by the non-simultaneous sampling
and noise. However, a high correlation between channel
measurements of Alice and Bob can still be maintained
and eligible for key generation in a slow fading channel,
as demonstrated in many practical experiments [36]–[39].
• Temporal variation indicates that there is randomness
residing in the dynamic channel3, which ensures the
extracted keys are random. A random key will make the
cryptographic applications robust against attacks such as
brute force.
• Spatial decorrelation implies that when located a half-
wavelength away from the legitimate users, the eaves-
dropper experiences an uncorrelated channel compared to
that between Alice or Bob, guaranteeing the security of
the key generation. When the system works at 2.4 GHz,
a half-wavelength is about 6 cm, which is quite short.
These principles have been theoretically modeled and analyzed
in [43], [44] and experimentally validated in [38], [39].
A. Procedure
Key generation involves channel probing, quantization, in-
formation reconciliation, and privacy amplification, as shown
in Figure 3. Without loss of generality, Alice is selected as the
initiator of the key generation process.
In the channel probing step, the randomness residing in
the temporal [36], [37], [43], frequency [43], [45]–[47], and
spatial [48]–[51] domains can be extracted by measuring the
channel parameters such as the received signal strength (RSS)
and CSI, etc. In particular, at time tA Alice sends a public
pilot signal to Bob who will measure the channel parameter
as XB. Then, at time tB = tA + τ , Bob also sends a public
pilot signal to Alice who will measure the same channel
parameter and store it as XA. Alice and Bob will repeat the
above channel sampling until they get enough measurements
to generate a full set of keys4. It is worth noting that in this
step, users adopt a public pilot signal to measure the channel
but do not try to exchange message secretly. It is possible that
some of the probe packets are not successful because of the
poor channel condition, which results in a mismatch between
the pairing of the measurements of Alice and Bob. This can
be solved by exchanging and comparing the timestamps of
the measurements, and keeping the records with the common
timestamps. In TDD mode, the common timestamp does not
necessarily indicate the timestamps with the exact same value,
but their difference should be the sampling delay τ . For
example, Alice will send her recorded timstamps to Bob, who
will compare his timestamps and keep the common ones. Bob
3In the urban area, the interference may be chaotic, because of the
densely deployed access points [40]. The interference will impact the channel
measurements accuracy but will not affect randomness nature of the wireless
link between users. In addition, the statistical features of the channel may
be deterministic [41], [42], but key generation is exploiting the instantaneous
channel variation, which is random in nature.
4The key length is determined by the cryptographic applications. For
example, the key length of AES can be 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit.
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WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE IOT
Technique Frequency Range Data Rate Security Countermeasure Applications
IEEE
802.15.4
(Zigbee)
2.4 GHz 10 to 100 m 250 kps AES in MAC layer
WSN, industrial,
environment, and healthcare
monitoring
BLE 2.4 GHz 50 to 150 m 1 Mbps AES in link layer
Wearable devices,
smartphones
IEEE 802.11
a/b/g/n
2.4 or 5 GHz 50 m > 100 Mbps WPA in MAC layer (with
AES implemented)
Smart home, entertainment
IEEE 802.11
ah
sub 1 GHz 1 km 150 Kbps
Smart city, smart grid, smart
home, healthcare,
LoRaWAN sub 1 GHz > 15 km 0.3 kbps to 50 kbps
Encryption at network
and application layer
Machine-to-machine, smart
city, and industrial
applications
TABLE II
RESOURCE AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION COMPARISON BETWEEN KEY GENERATION AND ECDH
Protocol Platform Architecture
Resources Energy
Code Size (kb) Cycles Computation (mJ) Communication (mJ) Total (mJ)
Key generation ARM Cortex-M3 32-bit 1.033 302,297 2.246 0.187 2.433
Key generation Intel MCS-51 8-bit 1.137 1,345,205 5.206 0.187 5.393
ECDH ARM Cortex-M3 32-bit 5.918 38,774,000 100.96 0.064 101.024
ECDH Intel MCS-51 8-bit 8.749 1,734,400,000 528.45 0.064 528.514
will then send his censored timestamps to Alice and she will
also only keep the common ones, which will finally enable
Alice and Bob to have the paired measurements. The exchange
does not reveal any useful information to eavesdroppers.
In the second step, both Alice and Bob will convert the
analog measurements into binary sequences using quantization
schemes. Mean and standard deviation-based quantizer [36]
(Algorithm 1) and cumulative distribution functions (CDF)-
based quantizer [52] (Algorithm 2) are two popular quantizers.
In Algorithm 1, µXu is the mean value of X
u, σXu is the
standard deviation ofXu, α is used to adjust the threshold, and
n is the number of the channel measurements. The design of
quantizer relies on the selection of threshold and quantization
level (QL). CDF-based quantization is able to obtain the
same proportion of 0s and 1s as it can adaptively adjust
the threshold, which is at the cost of increased complexity.
The computational complexity of calculating the mean and
variance is O(n). When calculating CDF, one key step is
sorting the measurements, whose complexity is O
(
n log(n)
)
,
which requires more computation than the calculation of the
mean and variance. A performance comparison of quantization
schemes is reported in [53].
In practical measurements, due to the half-duplex nature of
the most commercial hardware platforms and the independent
hardware noise, channel measurements of Alice and Bob, i.e.,
XA andXB, will not be identical, thus resulting in a disagree-
ment between KA and KB. In the information reconciliation
stage, Alice and Bob will leverage the error correction code
(ECC) to reach an agreement, which is achieved via public
discussion by exchanging information such as the syndrome.
Algorithm 1 Mean and standard deviation-based quantization
INPUT: Xu % Channel measurement, RSS or CSI
OUTPUT: Ku % Key
1: ηu+ = µXu + α × σXu % η
u
+ is the positive
threshold.
2: ηu
−
= µXu − α × σXu % η
u
−
is the negative
threshold.
3: for i← 1 to n do
4: if Xu(i) > ηu+ then
5: Ku(i) = 1
6: else if Xu(i) < ηu
−
then
7: Ku(i) = 0
8: else
9: Xu(i) dropped
10: end if
11: end for
Secure sketch [54] is a popular key reconciliation technique
and is given as an example in Algorithm 3. A comprehensive
survey on information reconciliation techniques can be found
in [55]. Finally, privacy amplification is employed to eliminate
the information revealed to eavesdroppers, which can be
implemented using hash functions [27].
B. Application
Due to its lightweight feature, this form of key generation
has strong potential to provide the security for IoT. It has
been applied in many wireless technologies, such as IEEE
6Algorithm 2 CDF-based quantization
INPUT: Xu % Channel measurement, RSS or CSI
INPUT: QL % Quantization level
OUTPUT: Ku % Key
1: F (x) = Pr(Xu < x) % CDF calculation
2: ηu0 = −∞ % Threshold
3: for j ← 1 to 2QL − 1 do
4: ηuj = F
−1( j
2QL
) % Threshold
5: end for
6: ηu
2QL
=∞
7: Construct Gray code bj and assign them to different
intervals [ηuj−1, η
u
j ]
8: for i← 1 to n do
9: if ηuj−1 ≤ X
u(i) < ηuj then
10: Ku(i,QL) = bj
11: end if
12: end for
Algorithm 3 Secure sketch
INPUT: KA, KB % Quantized keys of Alice and Bob
INPUT: C % ECC set shared by Alice and Bob
OUTPUT: KA, KB
′
% Reconciled key
1: Alice randomly selects c from an ECC set C
2: Alice calculates s = XOR(KA, c)
3: Alice transmits s to Bob through a public channel
4: Bob receives s
5: Bob calculates cB = XOR(KB, s)
6: Bob decodes cB to get c
7: Bob calculates KB
′
= XOR(c, s) = KA % Alice
and Bob agree on the same key
802.11, IEEE 802.15.4, Bluetooth, etc., with many proto-
types/implementations reported, see [27].
IEEE 802.11 is the most popular technique for the key gen-
eration implementation as the technique is widely adopted in
our daily life. The work in [36] is one of the first and important
papers that implemented key generation protocol. The authors
generated keys from the peak of channel impulse response
(CIR) using an 802.11 compatible field-programmable gate
array (FPGA)-based platform, and also from RSS with a
commercial Wi-Fi network interface card (NIC). However,
the key generation rate is rather limited, i.e., about 1 bps,
since the authors only extracted keys from coarse-grained
channel parameter. Orthogonal frequency-division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) is employed by IEEE 802.11a/g/n/ah, which can
provide fine-grained CSI in both time and frequency domain
and significantly improve the key generation performance [43],
[45].
A key generation system using wearable devices with IEEE
802.15.4 is implemented in [56]. Channel measurements are
carried out along with data transmission, in other words,
no dedicated transmission is incurred for key generation.
This avoids the additional energy burden required by key
generation, which can significantly save power consumption as
the radio transmission is always the dominant [17]. In addition,
a low cost filter is employed to improve the signal cross-
correlation, which helps the system reach an agreement as
high as 99.8% [56]. Since there is not much data transmission
required by wearable devices, the system takes about half an
hour to generate 128-bit keys. The duration is acceptable as it
still meets the requirement. For example, Wi-Fi recommends
to refresh the session key every hour.
Key generation has also been applied in Bluetooth sys-
tems [57]. The authors implemented their system in two
Google Nexus One smartphones and sampled RSS with experi-
ments in indoor and outdoor environments. Random frequency
hopping was employed to combat the interference from other
wireless networks running at the ISM bands. It has also
been demonstrated by experiments that Bluetooth-based key
generation can be carried out using much lower transmit power
(3 dBm) with a performance comparable to that of Wi-Fi-based
system, which is desirable for IoT devices.
IV. PHYSICAL LAYER ENCRYPTION
Modern communication systems employ a layered protocol
stack to organize communication functions and most of the
current security methodologies are applied at the MAC layer
and above. The physical layer is the lowest layer of the
protocol stack and was designed originally to modulate data
for transmission but without any security considerations. This
section introduces some recent ongoing encryption schemes
implemented at the physical layer, which protects the entire
physical layer packet. PLE schemes are lightweight as they
do not introduce additional complexity, therefore are quite
suitable for IoT applications.
A. Procedure
The data payload undergoes several physical layer modu-
lation stages, such as channel coding, mapping, inverse fast
Fourier transform (IFFT) operation (for OFDM systems), etc.
PLE can be applied by encrypting the data flow in these physi-
cal layer modulation stages. Some PLE schemes applicable for
OFDM systems are shown in Figure 4, including XOR encryp-
tion [58], phase encryption [58]–[60], and OFDM subcarriers
encryption [61]–[67]. The user first generates the encryption
information using the output of stream cipher or chaotic map-
ping. Based on the adopted encryption scheme, the encryption
information is used to calculate phase rotation, dummy sub-
carrier locations, or subcarrier scrambling/interleaving permu-
tation, etc., which is then used to protect the corresponding
modulation stage. The detailed calculation step will shown in
Section IV-B. The seed for the stream cipher or the initial
state of the chaotic map can be shared between legitimate
users using the key generation discussed in the last section.
The entire packet is protected. The encryption of the phys-
ical layer payload, i.e., the MAC layer packet, will secure
the MAC layer content, including the MAC header. In addi-
tion, the protection of the physical layer header can prevent
eavesdroppers from carrying out functions of synchronization
and channel estimation, significantly increasing the processing
overheads for the eavesdropper [67].
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B. Algorithm Prototype
The PLE design is determined by the wireless technologies
which employ different physical layer modulations. In this
section, we introduce several PLE prototypes based on the
modulation stage that they have encrypted.
XOR encryption is the most straightforward and lightweight
scheme and can be implemented in hardware in a very efficient
manner. As XOR is a bitwise operation, it usually happens
before coding, as shown in Figure 4. This scheme is applicable
to all the wireless technologies as the data passed from
the MAC layer is always in binary form. However, it is
implemented at the beginning of modulation stages and does
not randomize the physical layer waveform, which results in
a weaker protection [67].
Phase encryption can also be applied as long as phase-shift
keying or quadrature amplitude modulation is used [58]–[60].
As shown in Figure 4, phase encryption occurs after symbol
mapping and the constellation symbols are not in binary values
any more. The encrypted constellation symbols m′k can be
denoted as
m′k = mke
jθk + nk, (1)
wheremk is the constellation symbols, θk is the rotation angle,
and nk is the random noise. θk is generated according to the
key sequence and then used to rotate the constellation symbols.
In order to create a denser encrypted constellation, more key
bits are required to generate rotation angles, which increases
the key-to-data ratio5. Random noise, nk, can be deliberately
added to the rotated symbols to make it even more difficult
for the eavesdroppers to demodulate the ciphertext [59], [60].
The implementation of this technique is also efficient because
the main resource is a multiplier and related control circuits.
The OFDM technique modulates data onto multiple orthog-
onal subcarriers/frequencies and can significantly increase the
data rate, providing an additional domain to protect the data.
The parallel input data X can be scrambled in frequency
domain before IFFT operation [61]–[63], which can be given
5Key-to-data ratio is defined as the number of key bits needed to encrypt
one bit plaintext, which is a key metric of PLE.
as
X ′ = XSf , (2)
where Sf is the frequency scrambling matrix, or the IFFT
output data can be scrambled in the time domain [64] and
written as
x′ = xSt, (3)
where St is the time scrambling matrix. Scramble-based
schemes can bring a large search space. However, it may result
in a high computational complexity as matrix operations are
required, which may not be suitable for low cost devices [67].
Different from above OFDM schemes that scramble all
the data subcarriers, the work in [65], [66] interleaves only
part of the subcarriers. In particular, the scheme in [65]
selects a subset of the subcarriers whose phase is larger than
the threshold, and then interleaves their real and imaginary
components of the symbols. The method in [66] selects a
subcarrier subset based on the CSI, and then interleaves
these subcarriers according to the descending order of their
channel amplitudes. Encryption usually involves mathematical
operations, e.g., XOR operation, between the plaintext and
key sequence, but here the concept applies more generally
to the data manipulation according to the common secret
information. In addition, the authors use channel information
as encryption information directly without resorting to stream
ciphers, which requires a careful design of the interleaving
pattern because of the channel estimation errors at transmitters
and receivers.
While the standard OFDM systems use all the data sub-
carriers for data transmission, some subcarriers can also be
reserved to transmit dummy data, i.e., rubbish information,
for obfuscation [67]. Due to the introduction of dummy
subcarriers, there is a trade-off between the security and data
rate, but it has been demonstrated in [67] that it is worthwhile
as there are many subcarriers and the data rate is usually
only slightly reduced. In addition, the preambles are encrypted
in [67] so the entire packet is protected.
The above schemes protect different physical layer modu-
lation stages, which lead to distinctions on the security level,
8complexity, etc. For example, XOR and phase encryption are
easier to implement but provide less strong protection. On
the other hand, scrambling-based schemes may require ma-
trix operations, including matrix multiplication and inversion,
which result in a higher computation complexity. A detailed
comparison in terms of search space to the brute force attack,
key rate, and complexity of the above schemes can be found
in [67].
C. Practical Implementation
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there has been only
one paper which has implemented a physical layer phase
encryption IEEE 802.15.4 transceiver and RC4 to generate the
key sequence [68]. The work in [68] first validated the design
using FPGA technology and then implemented the system
in application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) using UMC
0.18 µm complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS)
technology. The security enhancement, including the RC4 and
phase encryption/decryption, results in a 26% increase on the
gate counts compared to a standard 802.15.4 transceiver, which
is a reasonable overheard for security.
V. FUTURE WORK SUGGESTIONS
Although there have been prototypes/demonstrations of the
above physical layer-based security countermeasures, research
is still needed to make these schemes more robust and perva-
sive. In this section, we suggest some future research directions
in securing the IoT from the physical layer.
A. Physical Layer Key Generation
Most current commercial platforms work in half-duplex
mode, and the keying nodes have to measure the channel
alternately in different time instances. Key generation in this
setting is only applicable to slow fading channels in order to
get a highly correlated measurements between users. There-
fore, key generation in fast fading channels is very challenging,
which limits its application, e.g. in vehicular communications.
Work in [69] and [70] designed key generation systems with
the maximum vehicle speed tested as 20 mph and 50 mph,
respectively, but their key generation rates are limited, e.g., 5
bit/s in [70]. In addition, work in [71] tested their algorithms in
indoor environment only. There is also some simulation work,
e.g., [72], [73]. Their performance in the practical fast fading
channels remains unknown. This topic is thus still require more
efforts, e.g., by using full-duplex hardware [74].
Efficient group and pairwise key generation are essential to
assist secure broadcast and unicast transmission in a large scale
IoT network. A fusion center broadcasts signals to the network
users, which requires a pre-establishment of a common session
key. The devices may also exchange unicast packets between
each other, and private keys between pairs of users are
required. In ad hoc IoT, many users may join and leave the
network frequently, therefore robust and efficient schemes to
update the session key and private keys are required. There
have been several group key generation protocols reported,
e.g., a time-slotted round-trip phase-based scheme [75], RSS-
based protocols for star and chain topologies [76], and group
key generation for mesh topology [77]. However, the scala-
bility (with the size of the group) and efficiency of the above
protocols are limited and more research effort is required.
Although key generation is able to achieve information-
theoretic security, in practice the security performance requires
special attention. For example, when there is a strong line-of-
sight, the spatial decorrelation may not hold any more, which
makes the system vulnerable to passive eavesdropping [39],
[78]. Key generation is also subject to active attacks [79],
[80], which will result in less efficient or even unsuccessful
key generation. It is thereof very important to design key
generation techniques secure from passive eavesdropping and
robust to active jamming. In addition, the majority of the
research focuses on the indoor and/or mobile channels, while
in an outdoor or static environment, the channel randomness
is rather limited. A less random key will expose the crypto-
graphic systems to brute force attack and should be always
avoided.
B. Physical Layer Encryption
PLE applies encryption at the physical layer, and entails
additional operations and hardware resources. No hardware
implementation for PLE schemes has been reported except for
those in [68]. The additional operations will introduce latency
in the critical path and may not meet the timing requirements
of the current MAC protocol. Therefore, a cross-layer design
between the physical and MAC layer is necessary.
The keys generated are usually fed to a stream cipher
to produce pseudo random numbers to encrypt plaintext. In
scenarios where keys can be generated fast or only very small
amount of data exchange is required, the keys generated can be
used to encrypt the data directly, rather than be used as the seed
for stream cipher. Key generation and PLE is then integrated
as a one-time pad scheme to offer perfect Shannon secrecy,
which can provide strongest protection ever. However, the
practical security performance and implementation requires
further investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has provided an overview on securing wireless
communications of IoT applications from the physical layer.
We have introduced two security techniques, namely, phys-
ical layer key generation and physical layer encryption. For
each, we have discussed their features and applications by
a special consideration of IoT devices’ low power and low
cost features. The remaining challenges of how to make these
schemes more robust and pervasive have also been proposed.
Unlike previous work, this article has focused on practical
prototypes/implementations, thus offering insights for their
applications in the IoT to enhance wireless security.
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